Years ago, when I was young and reckless, I believed that there was such a thing as an allinclusive domain.
The Plan
'Just is'-statements will be important in what follows, so let me start by giving you some examples:
1. SIBLING For Susan to be a sibling just is for her to share a parent with someone.
WATER
For the glass to be filled with water just is for it to be filled with H 2 O.
PHYSICALISM
For such-and-such a mental state to be instantiated just is for thus-and-such brainstate to be instantiated (and for the environment to be thus-and-so).
PROPERTIES
For Susan to instantiate the property of running just is for Susan to run.
DEATH
For a death to take place just is for someone to die.
TABLES
For there to be a table just is for there to be some things arranged tablewise.
DINOSAURS
For the number of the dinosaurs to be Zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs.
Tractarianism
I this section I will introduce my foil: a view that will be referred to as Tractarianism.
3 It makes no difference for present purposes whether there are any actual Tractarians. The point of If the former is true, then the relevant feature of reality can be accurately described by 'Socrates is dying', but not by 'Socrates's death is taking place'. If the latter is true, then the relevant feature of reality can be accurately described by 'Socrates's death is taking place', but not by 'Socrates is dying'. Either way, the 'just is' statement turns out to be false. When the price of objectivism is not worth paying, one should do more than simply deny that the relevant objectivist notion has any instances. One should deny that the notion makes sense. Someone who claims to understand the notion of objective fashionability faces the burden of elucidating the connection between objective and community-relative fashionability, whether or not she thinks the world happens to contain any instances of objectively fashionable outfits. For what gives rise to the explanatory burden is the concept of objective fashionability, not the assumption that it has any instances.
In some cases, of course, the price of objectivism is worth paying. The notion of objective truth is fruitful enough that few would feel unduly burdened by the need to explain the connection between objective truth and truth according to an agent, or by a picture of the world whereby there are brute facts about what is objectively true and what is not.
Metaphysics is filled with objectivist views. There are metaphysicians who believe that it makes sense to speak of objective similarity, as something over and above what might strike an agent as similar. 4 There are metaphysicians who believe it makes sense to speak of objectively fundamental vocabulary, as something over and above the role a piece of vocabulary plays in some scientific theory or other. 5 And-most relevantly for present purposes-a metaphysician might think that it makes sense to speak of the objectively correct way of carving up reality into objects, as something over and above the syntactic properties of the various representations one might use to describe the world.
Before embracing a form of metaphysical objectivism, it is important to be mindful of the costs. My own view is that when it comes to metaphysical structure, the price is not worth paying. For I suspect that many of the most interesting metaphysical questions can be addressed without having to appeal to the notion of metaphysical structure. Because of this, the need to elucidate the connection between an objectively correct way of carving up reality and the ways in which reality gets carved up by our representations strikes me as too high a price to pay for the resulting theoretical benefits. (At the same time, I don't think it would be irrational to think otherwise.
)

Bad Philosophy of Language
Even though I suspect that the notion of metaphysical structure makes no sense, I will not be relying on this assumption anywhere in the paper. My argument against Tractarianism will be based on the claim that Tractarianism is bad philosophy of language.
As the name suggests, Tractarianism is a close cousin of the 'picture theory' that Wittgenstein advocated in the Tractatus. 7 And it ought to be rejected for just the reason
Wittgenstein rejected the picture theory in his later writings. Namely: if one looks at the way language is actually used, one finds that usage is not beholden to the constraint that an atomic sentence can only be true if its semantic structure is in suitable correspondence with the metaphysical structure of the world.
It is simply not the case that ordinary speakers are interested in conveying information about metaphysical structure. The sentences 'a death took place' and 'someone died', for example, are used more or less interchangeably in non-philosophical contexts. An ordinary speaker might choose to assert one rather than the other on the basis stylistic considerations, or in order to achieve the right emphasis. But it would be tendentious to suggest that her choice turns on her views about metaphysical structure. It is not as if an ordinary speakers would only be prepared to assert 'a death took place' instead of 'someone died' if she has a certain metaphysical view about events: that they are amongst the entities carved out by the world's metaphysical structure. Think about how inappropriate it would be to respond to an assertion of 'a death took place' in a non-philosophical context by saying "I am certainly prepared to grant that someone died, but I just don't think that the world contains events amongst its ultimate furniture." One's interlocutor would think that one has missed the point of her assertion, and gone off to a different topic.
If ordinary assertions of 'a death took place' are not intended to limn the metaphysical structure of the world, what could be the motivation for thinking that the truth-conditions of the sentence asserted play this role? As far as I can tell, it is nothing over and above the idea that semantic structure ought to correspond to metaphysical structure. Remove this idea and there is no motivation left. To buy into Tractarianism is to start out with a preconception of the way language ought to work, and impose it on our linguistic theorizing from the outside-from beyond what is motivated by the project of making sense of our linguistic practice.
Moderate Tractarianism
There is a moderate form of Tractarianism according to which the constraint that there be a correspondence between semantic structure and metaphysical structure applies only to 
Compositionalism
I will now defend an alternative to Tractarianism: the view I shall refer to as compositionalism.
Suppose you introduce the verb 'to tableize' into your language, and accept 'for it to tableize just is for there to be a table' (where the 'it' in 'it tableizes' is assumed to play the same dummy role as the 'it' in 'it is raining'). Then you will think that what would be required of the world in order for the truth-conditions of 'it tableizes' to be satisfied is precisely what would be required of the world in order for the truth-conditions of 'there is a If object-talk is optional, what is the point of giving it a place in our language? The right answer, it seems to me, is "compositionality". A language involving object-talk-that is, a language including singular terms and quantifiers binding singular term positions-is attractive because it enables one to give a recursive specification of truth-conditions for a class of sentences rich in expressive power. But there is not much more to be said on its behalf. In setting forth a language, we want the ability to express a suitably rich range of truth-conditions. If we happen to carry out this aim by bringing in singular terms, it is because they supply a convenient way of specifying the right range of truth-conditions, not because they have some further virtue.
A proponent of this sort of view will disagree with the Tractarian about what it takes for a singular term to succeed in referring. Whereas the Tractarian would insist that a singular term can only succeed in referring if it is paired with one of the objects carved out by the
•
It is easy to verify that every condition on the compositionalist's list is satisfied. Notice, in
N is '∃z(z is parallel to a)', and since every line is parallel to itself, all that is required for the truth-conditions of '∃x(x = the direction ⋆ of a)' to be satisfied is that a exist.
We have been focusing on an example from the natural sciences, but our conclusions carry over to 'just is' statements in metaphysics. One has to balance the cost of rejecting the relevant statement-an increase the range of questions that are regarded as rightfully demanding answers-with the cost of accepting the statement-a decrease in the range of theoretical resources one has at one's disposal.
There is no quick-and-easy criterion for determining whether the extra theoretical space is fruitful enough to justify paying the price of having to answer a new range of potentially problematic questions. The only reasonable way to proceed is by rolling up one's sleaves and doing metaphysics.
13
Suppose we are considering whether to accept 'for a time to be present just is for it to have a certain relational property'. By accepting the 'just is' statement one would eliminate the need to answer an awkward question: what does it take for a time to be present simpliciter,
as opposed to present relative to some time or other? But there is a price to be paid, because it is not immediately obvious that one will have the theoretical resources to explain the feeling that there is something special about the present. By rejecting the 'just is' statement, on the other hand, one would be left with a gap to fill-one needs to explain what it is for a time to be present simpliciter as something over and above being present relative to some time or other. One could try to fill the gap by saying something like 'to be present simpliciter is to be at the edge of objective becoming', and thereby introduce a new theoretical resource. It is not immediately obvious, however, that such a move would lead to fruitful theorizing, or be especially effective in explaining the feeling that there is something special about the present.
The decision whether to accept the 'just is' statement is a decision about how to best negotiate these competing theoretical pressures.
Here is a second example. Suppose we are considering whether to accept 'to experience the sensation of seeing red just is to be in a certain brain state'. What sorts of considerations might be used to advance the issue in an interesting way? Jackson's Knowledge Argument immediately suggests itself:
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Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world… If physicalism is 13 Here I am indebted to Andrew Graham's PhD thesis. 14 See Jackson (1982) and Jackson (1986) ; for a review of more recent literature, see Byrne (2006) .
true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies… It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see something red, say (Jackson (1986) ).
What Jackson's argument brings out is that physicalists face a challenge. They must somehow accommodate the fact that it seems like Mary acquires information about the world-information she did not already have-when she first experiences the sensation of seeing red, even though physicalism appears to entail that she does not. My own view is that the challenge can be met. 15 But someone who thinks that the challenge cannot be met might see the argument as motivating the introduction of possibilities that a physicalist would regard as unintelligible. According to the physicalist, to experience the sensation of seeing red just is to be in a certain brain state. So it makes no sense to consider a scenario in which someone is in the brain state but lacks the sensation. If, however, one were to give up physicalism and countenance the intelligibility of such a scenario, one might be able to relieve some of the pressure generated by Jackson's argument. For one could claim that, even though Mary knew all along that she would be in the relevant brain state when she was first shown a ripe tomato, she did not yet know if she would also experience the relevant sensation. It is only after she is actually shown the tomato, and experiences the relevant sensation, that she is in a position to rule out a scenario in which she is in the brain state without having the sensation. And this ruling out of scenarios substantiates the claim that Mary does indeed acquire information about the world when she is first shown the tomato.
I think there are good reasons for resisting this way of addressing the puzzle. (See, for instance, Lewis (1988) .) But suppose one takes it to work. Suppose one thinks that by creating a gap between being in the relevant brain state and experiencing the relevant sensation-and thereby making room for the possibility of being in the brain state without having the sensation-one can adequately account for a case like Mary's. Then one will be motivated to give up the 'just is' statement that keeps the gap closed ('to experience the sensation of seeing red just is to be in a certain brain state'). But doing so comes at a cost because it opens up space for awkward questions. to obtain. My own view is that in this case the costs outweigh the benefits, and that one should reject the idea that part of what it is to be our world is to instantiate the physical laws.
Avoiding the Tractarian Legacy
The Tractarian can be expected to reject statements 4-7 from section 1. But it seems to me that they are all cases in which the advantages of accepting the 'just is'-statement far outweigh the disadvantages. Consider TABLES. By accepting the claim that for there to be a table just is for there to be some things arranged tablewise, one eliminates the need to address an awkward question: what would it take for a region that is occupied by some things arranged tablewise to also be occupied by a table? It is true that one also looses access to a certain amount of theoretical space, since one is no longer in a position to work with scenarios in which there are things arranged tablewise but no tables. It seems to me, however, that this is not much of a price to pay, since the availability of such scenarios is not very likely to lead to fruitful theorizing. (Not everyone would agree; see, for instance, van Inwagen (1990) .)
For similar reasons, it seems to me that PROPERTIES, DEATH and DINOSAURS are all eminently sensible 'just is'-statements. Again, not everyone will agree. But I hope to have convinced you that these statements shouldn't be rejected merely on the basis of syntactic considerations. They should be rejected only if one thinks that the resulting theoretical space leads to theorizing that is fruitful enough to pay the price of answering awkward questions.
And the relevant questions can be very awkward indeed. By rejecting DINOSAURS, for example, one is is forced to concede that the following is a legitimate line of inquiry:
I can see that there are no dinosaurs. What I want to know is whether it is also true that the number of the dinosaurs is Zero. And I would like to understand how one could ever be justified in taking a stand on the issue, given that we have no causal access to the purported realm of abstract objects.
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If, on the other hand, you accept DINOSAURS you will think that such queries rest on a false presupposition. They presuppose that there is a gap between the non-existence of dinosaurs and dinosaurs' having Zero as a number-a gap that needs to be plugged with a philosophical account of mathematical objects. DINOSAURS entails that the gap is illusory.
There is no need to explain how the non-existence of dinosaurs might be correlated with dinosaurs' having Zero as a number because there is no difference between the two: for the number of the dinosaurs to be Zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs.
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Of course, you won't see the closing of this theoretical gap as a real benefit unless you think that the resulting theory is consistent with a sensible metaphysical picture of the world, and unless you think that it gives rise to a sensible philosophy of mathematics. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to addressing the first of these two challenges: I will argue that a compositionalist incurs no untoward metaphysical commitments by accepting a 'just is' statement like DINOSAURS. 
Paraphrase
It is tempting to think that in accepting a 'just is'-statement one commits oneself to the availability of a paraphrase-method for translating vocabulary that appears on one side of the statement into vocabulary that appears on the other. Consider, for example, an antitractarian who accepts every instance of the following schema:
NUMBERS
For the number of the Fs to be n just is for there to be exactly n Fs.
It is tempting to think that she should also be committed to the claim that arbitrary arithmetical statements can be paraphrased as statements containing no mathematical vocabulary.
It seems to me that this would be a mistake. The availability of a suitable paraphrasefunction depends on the expressive richness of one's non-mathematical vocabulary. And the decision to accept NUMBERS should be based on a cost-benefit analysis of the sort suggested above, not on whether one has access to a powerful enough stock of non-mathematical linguistic resources.
It is easy to overestimate the importance of paraphrase when one sees things from the perspective of a nominalist: someone who thinks that numbers don't exist. For a nominalist might think that non-mathematical paraphrases are needed to give an adequate statement of our best scientific theories, and of the real content of our mathematical accomplishments.
But a friend of NUMBERS is no nominalist, and would see little advantage in stating our scientific theories or mathematical accomplishments in a non-mathematical language.
Suppose, for example, that 'there is an even number of stars' can be paraphrased as a nonmathematical statement, ϕ. In all likelihood, ϕ will be significantly more cumbersome than its mathematical counterpart. And a friend of NUMBERS will think that its truth-conditions impose no less of a demand on the world, since she will think that for ϕ to be the case just is for there to be an even number of stars. 21 She will therefore see little point in reformulating her scientific or mathematical theorizing in terms of ϕ.
The question of whether it is possible to paraphrase arbitrary mathematical statements as statements containing no mathematical vocabulary is an interesting one, and I take it up in Rayo (typescript) . The present point is simply that one should not confuse NUMBERS with the view that a suitable paraphrase-function exists. Accepting a 'just is'-statement is one thing; committing oneself to the availability of paraphrase-functions relating vocabulary on either side of the statement is another.
Absolute Generality
In this section I will consider the question of whether an anti-Tractarian should think that there is such a thing as an all-inclusive domain.
The first thing to note is that there are several different ways of cashing out the claim that there is such as thing as an all-inclusive domain:
There is a definite fact of the matter about how the world is, and it is in principle possible to give a fully comprehensive description of its contents.
• Second Reading
There is a 'fundamental domain'-a domain consisting of the entities that are carved out by the world's metaphysical structure.
• Third Reading [Recarving-Absolutism] There is a 'maxi-domain'-a domain consisting of the entities that result from every possible way of carving up the world into objects.
What should the anti-Tractarian say about the existence of an all-inclusive domain, on each of these readings?
We have seen that anti-Tractarianism is compatible with both Realism and Comprenensivism. So, on the first of the three readings, there is no tension between antiTractarianism and the existence of an all-inclusive domain.
What about the second reading? Anti-Tractarianism is neutral with respect to the existence of a 'fundamental domain'. To address the issue of a fundamental domain would require deploying the notion of metaphysical structure, and anti-Tractarianism does no such thing.
Let us therefore turn our attention to the third reading. The anti-Tractarian believes that there are tables. So a 'maxi-domain' would have to include tables. But according to the antiTractarian, the fact that there are tables could also be described by saying that there are halftables put together in the right sort of way, or that the property of tablehood is instantiated, or that some mereological simples are arranged tablewise, or that the set of tables is nonempty, or that the number of tables is greater than Zero. So the maxi-domain would also have to include half-tables and instantiated properties of tablehood and mereological simples arranged tablewise and non-empty sets and numbers greater than Zero and Zero itself, and so forth.
Could such a list ever be completed? It seems to me that anti-Tractarians should be skeptical about the claim that it could. It is not that an anti-Tractarian should think that the world is somehow incomplete. The problem is that there is no reason to think that our concept of 'carving the world into objects' is determinate enough to allow for a final answer to the question of how it might be possible to carve up reality into objects. Let me explain.
Unpacking the 'carving' metaphor
As I understand it, a 'carving' of the world is nothing more than a compositional system of representation for describing the world. In the most familiar case, a carving is a compositional system of linguistic representation: a language in which the truth-conditions of sentences are generated recursively from the semantic values of a restricted set of basic lexical items. To say that a subject carves the world into objects is simply to say that she represents the world using a language that contains singular terms, or variables that take singular term positions. Similarly, to say that a subject carves the world into properties is simply to say that she represents the world using a language that contains predicates, or variables that take predicate positions.
Carving up the world is not like carving up a turkey. For the purposes of spelling out the carving-metaphor, one is not to think of the world as a big object-the mereological fusion of everything there is-and of a carving as a way of subdividing the world into smaller parts.
The world, for these purposes, is to be thought of as 'the totality of facts, not of things', and a carving is to be thought of as a compositional system for describing these facts. Whenever we dream up a new mechanism for representing reality, the potential for a new compositional language-and hence for a new way of carving up the world-will be in
place.
An analogy
An analogy might be helpful. Suppose you are told that the ORDINALS are built up in stages.
One starts with a 'base' ORDINAL, and at each stage one gets a new ORDINAL by pooling together all the ORDINALS that have been constructed so far. The process is to be carried out indefinitely.
In the absence of further constraints, your understanding of 'ORDINAL' will be hopelessly incomplete. It will be consistent with taking the ORDINALS to be isomorphic with the natural numbers. But it will also be consistent with taking the ORDINALS to be isomorphic with the natural numbers followed by an additional copy of the natural numbers-or two additional copies, or three, or as many copies of the natural numbers as there are natural numbers. In fact, one's understanding of 'ORDINAL' will be consistent with taking the ORDINALS to be isomorphic with any limit von Neumann ordinal.
Notice, moreover, that assuming that there is a definite plurality of von Neumann ordinals wouldn't bring a natural end to the process. For although your understanding of 'ORDINAL' is consistent with taking the ORDINALS to be isomorphic with the von Neumann ordinals, it is also consistent with taking the ORDINALS to be isomorphic with the von Neumann ordinals, followed by an ω-sequence of additional objects-or two ω-sequences of additional objects, or an additional ω-sequence for each von Neumann ordinal. And so on.
If you give me a definite characterization of 'ORDINAL', I can use it to supply a significantly more generous one. (I can say, for instance, "the ORDINALS are isomorphic to the structure you just articulated followed by a copy of the structure you just articulated for every point in the structure you just articulated".) And, crucially what it would mean to iterate this process 'all the way up'-anything significantly more illuminating than the vague idea that it could be carried out 'indefinitely'. And, of course, the order of the quantifiers is not the only dimension along which the expressive power of a language might be expanded. If you give me a definite system of linguistic representation, there may be other ways in which I can use it to supply a significantly more generous one.
A light-weight conception of objecthood?
You may be worried that my way of cashing out the carving-metaphor is too light-weight.
"If the only relevant difference between asserting 'there are tables' and asserting 'some things are arranged tablewise' is to do with the system of compositional representation one chooses to employ"-you might be tempted to complain-"then someone who asserts 23 For more on this sort of picture, see Parsons (1974) . 24 For more on languages of transfinite order, see Linnebo and Rayo (typescript) .
Perhaps you mean something different by 'really'. Perhaps what you have in mind is that in order for something to really exist, it must figure in a 'fundamental' description of the world. It must, in other words, be carved out by the world's metaphysical structure. In this sense of real existence, the view defended in this paper is neutral on the issue of whether there is anything that exists but doesn't 'really' exist.
A language-infused world?
"Wait a minute!"-you might be tempted to complain-"Are you setting forth a view according to which the existence of objects is somehow constituted by language?"
Absolutely not. What is 'constituted by language' is the use of singular terms. If we had no singular terms (or variables taking singular term positions) we wouldn't be able to describe the world in a way that made the existence of objects explicit. But there would be objects just the same. Speakers of a language with no singular terms can say things like 'Lo, tableization here!'. But for it to tableize just is for there to be a table. So even without singular terms, they would be in a position to convey information about tables. 
